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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RAYMOND DEHERRERA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
) Case No. 960300-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim. P. 
26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action 
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment 
and conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital 
felony. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this 
brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
U.S. Constitutional Amendment VI 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether trial counsel was ineffective in his trial 
preparation, investigation and failure to call an expert witness 
to espouse his theory of the case? 
"Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve a mixed 
question of law and fact. Thus, *where a trial court has 
previously heard a motion based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel, reviewing courts are free to make an independent 
determination of a trial court's conclusions.' However, the 
findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for one 
count of burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202, in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, presiding. On January 16, 1996, a jury found the 
defendant guilty of one count of burglary. 
On March 29, 1996, the trial court sentenced the defendant 
to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for the burglary 
conviction. After the sentencing the defendant filed a notice of 
appeal. Pursuant to that appeal counsel for the defendant 
filed, on December 4, 1996, a motion to remand for determination 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. On January 10, 1997, this 
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Court granted the remand and ordered the case remanded to the 
District Court for an evidentiary hearing. On March 24, 1997, an 
evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Frederick in the Third 
District Court. Following that remand the defendant's appeal is 
now before this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It was alleged at trial that the appellant was inside 
the house of Kenneth Struhs, when he was shot in the leg by Mr. 
Struhs. (Tr. 1/16/96 at 37-68). In the opening statement made 
by trial counsel it is clear that the theory of the case as 
stated by appellant's trial counsel was that the appellant was 
not in Mr. Struhs house when he was shot, but was there with an 
acquaintance and was unaware of the fact that the acquaintance 
was breaking into the house until it was too late. (Tr. 1/16/96 
at 30-37) . 
In accordance with trial counsel's theory of the case, and 
the appellant's explanation for his presence outside Mr. Struhs 
residence, the family of the appellant and the appellant alleges 
that trial counsel requested and obtained money from them to hire 
an expert. (Tr. 3/24/97 at 9, 16, 18-19). However, no such 
expert was ever obtained. In fact, trial counsel did not call 
any witnesses at the one day trial. Instead, he testified that 
he was relying on cross-examination techniques to represent the 
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appellant. 
During the trial, appellant's trial counsel attempted to 
cross-examine Mr. Struhs on the fact that the appellant was shot 
in the back of the leg and not the front. (Tr. 1/16/96 at 66-
67). This fact was crucial to his theory of the case. However, 
as he attempted to ask questions regarding the entry location of 
the wound he was stopped by the court because there was no expert 
testimony to support his claim. (Tr. 1/16/96 at 67). However, 
at the Rule 23B hearing on remand the appellant's trial counsel 
testified that he wanted an expert but that he did not have the 
resources. (Tr. 3/24/97 at 57). However, appellant's trial 
counsel could not even testify that he contacted any expert 
witnesses in this case. (Tr. 3/24/97 at 59). Although, he did 
testify that it would have been "perhaps effective to have an 
expert witness if we knew and if we'd been able to get a hold of 
that expert witness at a time we were going to feel very 
confident what he was going to testify to..." (Tr. 3/24/97 at 
63) . 
At the rule 23B hearing the court accepted as a proffer the 
fact that the defendant was outside of the home at the time of 
the shooting. (Tr. 3/24/97 at 6). He accepted as a proffer the 
fact that the defendant never entered the home. (Tr. 3/24/97 at 
7). The court also accepted as a proffer the fact that the 
defendant was turning to his right, away from the shooter, when 
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he was shot from the back of the leg. (Tr. 3/24/97 at 11). 
Furthermore, at the hearing on remand an expert testified 
that the key trial witness Mr. Struhs' trial testimony would have 
been shown to be inconsistent and unbelievable had he, as an 
expert, testified at trial. (Tr. 3/24/97 at 37-41). 
Appellant's trial counsel's vision is seriously impaired. 
The record is replete with the fact that trial counsel's vision 
was impaired. (Tr. 1/16/96 at 30, 78 and tr. 3/15/96 at 2-3). 
At the hearing on remand the appellant's trial counsel testified 
that he was legally blind in one eye and just barely above 
legally blind in the other eye. (Tr. 3/24/97 at 47-48). He 
testified that he could only see photographs if they were a 
couple of inches away from him. (Tr. 3/24/97 at 50). He also 
testified that he cannot see anybody distinctly. (Tr. 3/24/97 at 
49) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The attorney hired to represent the appellant at trial was 
deficient in his performance. Having failed to adequately 
investigate the case and call a material expert witness to 
support his theory of the case, the appellant's trial counsel was 
ineffective. Counsel was given money to obtain an expert and did 
not contact any expert about the case. Had counsel called an 
expert to support his theory of the case there is a reasonable 
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probability of a different result. Also, trial counsel's 
eyesight was so bad that it prohibited effective representation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY TRIAL COUNSEL'S 
FAILURE TO CALL AN EXPERT WITNESS. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United 
States Supreme Court, analyzing the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution,1 set out a two-prong test for determining 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court stated: 
First, the defendant must show that 
counsel's performance was deficient. This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the 'counsel1 guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. This requires 
showing that counsel's errors were so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, 
a trial whose result is reliable. 
Id. at 687. 
In deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 
court must evaluate the reasonableness of counsel's actions at 
the time of the alleged error and in light of all the 
circumstances, id. at 689. A court must make "every effort . . 
lrThis Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "in all criminal 
prosecutions," the accused shall have the "assistance of counsel for his defense." United States 
Constitution Amendment VI. 
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. to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." Id. An 
evaluating court must "indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances the challenged action 
might be considered sound trial strategy." United States v. 
Taylor, 832 F.2d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 1987)(quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689). 
In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court was confronted with a similar issue as the present 
case. In Templin, the defendant was convicted by a jury of rape 
and aggravated sexual assault. The defendant claimed that his 
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to contact several 
prospective witnesses. The Utah Supreme Court following 
Strickland stated: 
If counsel does not adequately investigate 
the underlying facts of a case, including the 
availability of prospective defense 
witnesses, counsel's performance cannot fall 
within the Vide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.' This is because a 
decision not to investigate cannot be 
considered a tactical decision. It is only 
after adequate inquiry has been made that 
counsel can make a reasonable decision to 
call or not to call particular witnesses for 
tactical reasons. Therefore, because 
defendant's trial counsel did not make a 
reasonable investigation into the possibility 
of procuring prospective defense witnesses, 
the first part of the Strickland test has 
been met. 
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State v, Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 (emphasis added, citations 
omitted). 
A similar situation exists here. The defendant's trial 
counsel did not adequately investigate this case, nor did he 
prepare adequately for trial. It was clear that trial counsel's 
theory of the case was that the appellant did not enter the 
residence. However, his only preparation was to believe that he 
could obtain the information he needed through adequate cross-
examination. (Tr. 3/24/97 at 59). He stated that he could not 
afford to contact an expert witness. He stated that he did not 
have the money.2 (Tr. 3/24/97 at 60). Although, he admitted 
that he would have preferred to have had an expert. (Tr. 3/24/97 
at 60, 63). It is clear that the appellant has met the first 
prong of the Strickland test and shown deficient performance. 
In TemplinF the court considered the second prong of the 
test as follows: 
This testimony (of a witness not called) is 
important for the reason that it reflects 
upon the credibility of [the victim], because 
[the] testimony, although not completely 
consistent with [defendant's] testimony, 
contradicts several aspects of [victim's] 
testimony. This is important in the instant 
2Counsel's argument that he could not afford an expert witness and therefore he did not 
contact any experts, flies in the face of established minimum standards for indigent defendants. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-l(3)(the state is to provide investigatory and other facilities 
necessary for a complete defense). If the appellant truly could not afford an expert it was 
counsel's responsibility to call this to the attention of the trial judge and proceed in a manner 
whereby the state would pay for the expert. 
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case because [victim's] testimony is the only 
direct evident of [defendant's] guilt. In 
reviewing this testimony, it is important to 
note that because it affects the credibility 
of the only witness who gave direct evidence 
of defendant's guilt, the testimony affects 
the ^entire evidentiary picture.' . . . An 
appellate court cannot discern the exact 
effect such testimony would have hade on the 
jury's judgment concerning the credibility of 
[defendant] and [victim]. The testimony, 
however, is of sufficient import that we feel 
there is a reasonable probability that if 
these witnesses had been called at trial, the 
outcome of the trial would have been 
different. Since both parts of the 
Strickland, test have been met, we hold that 
[defendant] was denied his constitutional 
right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Templin. at 188-89. 
The situation in the present case is similar. The 
prosecution's case rested on the testimony of Kenneth Struhs. 
His testimony was the direct evidence of the appellant's entry 
into the residence. For the appellant to be convicted the jury 
had to have believed that he entered the residence and was in the 
house when he was shot. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (which 
states that to be guilty of burglary a person must "enter or 
remain unlawfully in a building"). The appellant's trial 
counsel's theory of the case was the fact that the appellant did 
not go in the residence and in fact was shot in the back of the 
leg and not the front, while he was outside of the 
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dwelling.3 Trial counsel's failure to contact an expert and call 
one at trial in support of that theory was ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Furthermore, the appellant was prejudiced by trial 
counsel's inaction resulting in a conviction that would not have 
been possible had an expert testified to the inconsistencies as 
testified to at the hearing on remand. See Tr. 3/24/97 at 37-41. 
Thus, but for trial counsel's deficient performance there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different. State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 1995). 
II. TRIAL COUNSEL'S EYESIGHT PROHIBITED 
HIM FROM EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTING 
THE APPELLANT. 
Appellant's trial counselfs vision is seriously impaired. 
The record is replete with the fact that trial counsel's vision 
is impaired. (Tr. 1/16/96 at 30, 78 and tr. 3/15/96 at 2-3). At 
the trial, exhibits in the form of diagrams and photographs were 
submitted by the state and it is clear from the record that 
appellant's trial counsel could not adequately view these 
diagrams and photos. This fact supports ineffective assistance 
of counsel in and of itself as counsel was ineffective in his 
ability to represent the appellant. The prejudice from this 
factor is self evident an attorney whose eyesight is impaired 
3The appellant has been prejudiced by the fact that had a jury heard testimony to support 
the claim that the appellant was never in the house, the most he could have been convicted of 
would have been an attempted burglary, a third degree felony. 
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cannot, alone, effectively represent a defendant in a trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the appellant's conviction and 
remand this case for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ V ^ d a y of September, 1997. 
BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Benjamin A. Hamilton, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84102, and two copies to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this ^  / 
day of September, 1997. 
7^ 
BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON 
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